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Abstract
The inflationary effect of oil price has been widely examined by aca-
demic literature. Nowadays, the main concern in the euro area (E.A.) is
its deflationary effect. In this paper we propose a method to evaluate the
effect of oil price changes on inflation as well as an indicator of inflation
adjusted for the short-term effect of oil prices, which is aimed to assess
the risk of deflation in real time. We illustrate the practical applications
of these tools by predicting the evolution of inflation in the E.A., condi-
tional to different scenarios of oil price deflation. Our main finding is that
no deflationary scenario for oil prices results in a negative inflation rate
forecast for October 2016, despite oil price variation accounting for 25%
of the variance of changes in inflation.
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1 Introduction
The relevance of oil prices as a source of variations in prices is established since
the 1970s. However, in the last two decades several works have documented
that this relevance has decreased. Hooker [2002] finds no significant impact of
oil prices changes on U.S. inflation, excluding energy products. DeGregorio et al.
[2007] document an important reduction in the contribution of oil prices changes
on consumer prices, providing evidence for a sample of 34 countries. Blanchard
and Gal´ı [2010] find that the inflationary impact of crude costs decreased since
mid 1980s. Kilian [2008a,b] states that the effect of exogenous oil prices shocks
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on inflation in G7 countries is quite small and highlights its heterogeneity across
countries. A´lvarez et al. [2011] find that the contribution of oil price changes is
limited, but still constitutes a major driver of inflation variability in Spain and
the euro area, mainly through direct effects.
Several reasons have been proposed to explain this loss of relevance (e.g.,
DeGregorio et al. [2007], Blanchard and Gal´ı [2010]): higher energy efficiency
of production processes, relevance of globalization or changes in the conduct of
monetary policy.
The emphasis of academic analyses also changed. Previous studies tradi-
tionally focused in assessing the inflationary effect of the increases in oil price.
However, the main concern in the recent months is the risk of a deflation spiral
unchained by oil prices reductions.
The main contributions of this paper are: (i) a method to assess the effects of
oil prices changes in inflation under different oil price scenarios and (ii) a model-
based indicator of inflation adjusted for the short-term effect of oil prices, being
this indicator a potentially useful tool to track in real time the risk of deflation.
We illustrate the practical application of these tools by means of a simulation
analysis of the risk of deflation in the euro area (E.A.).1.
To this end, we first fit a time series model relating the annual variation
rates of inflation and oil price. Its dynamic structure implies that the price of
crude oil in any given month affects consumer prices in the same month and the
month after, with no feedback in the opposite direction of Granger causality. We
provide several justifications for this assumption, as well as a Granger-causality
test for the E.A.
With this model we: (a) compute twelve-months ahead forecast for inflation
in the E.A., conditional to different scenarios of oil price deflation and (b) es-
timate which part of the recent evolution of consumer prices can be attributed
to changes in oil prices. This analysis incorporates two novelties: an interpo-
lation method to compute forecasts conditional to any predetermined terminal
value using a fixed-interval smoother (see Anderson and Moore [1979]), and the
procedure developed by Casals et al. [2010], which computes the contribution
of each input to the output for any model in transfer function form.
The main results of this analysis are: (a) negative inflation is not expected
for the twelve-months-ahead forecasts in any of the three scenarios, (b) the
short-time effect of oil on consumer prices is important, as it accounts for 25%
of the variance of changes in inflation so, (c) a spiral of deflation/economic
contraction could finally happen if a long period of anemic inflation/deflation
affects the consumer expectations and, through them, the economic activity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodological
foundations, describes the data and provides a preliminary exploration of their
dynamic properties. Section 3 describes the model-building process and Section
4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 provides some concluding
remarks.
1E.A. refers to the respective country compositions at a specific point in time: E.A.11-
2000, E.A.12-2006, E.A.13-2007, E.A.15-2008, E.A.16-2010, E.A.17-2013, E.A.18-2014, and
E.A.19-2015. Euro area is the official name for the Eurozone
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2 Methodology
2.1 Methodological issues
Our analysis concentrates in the effect of oil prices over inflation in the E.A. An
important issue when developing this analysis is to consider the possibility of a
feedback relationship, with inflation explaining oil prices.
There is a widespread agreement in the current literature that oil price should
be considered endogenous with respect to macroeconomic aggregates, in partic-
ular with respect to U.S. GDP growth (see, e.g., Barsky and Kilian [2004];
Kilian [2008c]; Hamilton [2009]; Kilian [2014]). This idea is based in the weight
of U.S. GDP growth on the global demand, including oil demand, and hence on
oil prices.
On the other hand, the Granger (G- causality) test has often been used to
test whether U.S. inflation help in predicting oil price changes. G-causality is
usually not found after 1975 (Hooker [1996], Gillman and Nakov [2009], Alquist
et al. [2013]). 2
The E.A. shows three important differences with U.S.: its lack of internal oil
production, its smaller economic size3 and its lower influence through monetary
policy. Accordingly, we will first assess whether E.A., with 13% of global oil
consumption is large enough to determine oil prices4. In comparison, the con-
sumption in U.S. has been 23%. To this end, in the next Sub-section we test for
linear G-causality, finding no significant influence of E.A. inflation on oil prices.
Building on this negative result, we use in our analysis a transfer function
(TF) specification (Box et al. [1994]), relating oil price (cause) to E.A. infla-
tion (effect) instead of the vector autoregressive (VAR) framework model (e.g.,
Hamilton [1983]; Jime´nez-Rodr´ıguez and Sa´nchez [2005]; Kilian [2009]; Blan-
chard and Gal´ı [2010]).
The main reason for this choice is that, if no relation exists between lagged
inflation and current oil price, then the bidirectional VAR representation looses
its main advantage when compared to the unidirectional TF model. On the
other hand, the TF model has two compelling advantages for our analysis.
First, the TF is a structural model, allowing one to attribute the contem-
porary correlation to a specific causal direction, while the reduced-form VAR
model captures this correlation in a non-causal way. This is specially impor-
tant in our analysis because the contemporaneous correlation between oil price
changes and inflation: (a) has been shown to be unidirectional (Kilian and Vega
[2011]), (b) is much stronger than the lagged ones, so it (c) has a strong con-
tribution to the point forecasts and fitted values for inflation employed in our
2Alquist et al. [2013] find, however, that U.S. inflation G-causes oil prices if 1973 and 1974
are included in the analysis
3In terms of its share of global GDP in PPP in 2014, the euro area is the world’s third-
largest economy (12.2%), after the United States (15.9%) and China (16.6%).
4This percentage has been obtained as the mean participation between 1996 and 2014 of
the oil consumption of 11 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) in the total world. These data come
from the British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 http://www.bp.com.
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analysis.
Second, inflation displays a strong seasonal fluctuation which is easier to
capture in the ARIMA model for the errors of a TF than in a VAR framework.
2.2 The data
In this Sub-section, we provide a exploratory analysis of the data that we will
model later.
We will denote by PEAt the Harmonized Index of Consumer Price (HICP),
by OEURt the nominal price of Brent in e per barrel, by O
US$
t the price of
Brent in US$ and by ERt the exchange rate e/US$.5 In all cases the observa-
tion frequency is monthly and the sampling period runs from January 1996 to
December 2015.
Building on this data we computed the annual percent variation rates, de-
fined by:
r12(xt) =
(
xt
xt−12
− 1
)
× 100
Hence these basic variables often appear transformed in annual percent rates:
r12(OEURt ) for annual percent change in oil prices, and r
12(PEAt ) for inflation
in the E.A.
The profile of these series is shown in Figure 1. The second and third panels
allows us to identify several oil price periods: First, the negative shock started in
1997, caused mainly by falls in oil market-specific demand following Asian crisis
of 1997-1998. This effect was accompanied by positive rebounds started in late
1998 that reaches its maximum in February 2000. Second, several sustained
positive rates between late 2002 and early 2008, driven by global aggregate
demand originates in a stronger economic growth, especially in Asian economies.
This effect was reversed by a sharp drop in prices associated with the global crisis
of 2007-2009. This effect was also accompanied by positive rebounds started in
2009 that reaches its maximum in December 2009. Finally, there has been a
sustained fall in prices since late 2009, associated with a strong global supply
and a weak global demand.6 The correlation between r12(OEURt ) and r
12(OUSt )
is 0.952, suggesting that the exchange rate plays a minor role in determining the
oil price in Euros. This preliminary result is further confirmated by the analysis
in section 3.2., models (4)-(5).
As expected, these series display changes in the mean, so their stationary
transformation would be a first-order difference.7 Accordingly, the resulting
5The HICP data come from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). We consider the oil price in
U.S. dollar downloaded from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) web page
http://www.eia.gov and use the monthly average exchange rate published by the OECD
http://www.stats.oecd.org to calculate the equivalent value in euros.
6For details see e.g., Kilian [2009].
7In our opinion, OEURt could either be I(1) or display a weak seasonality which is buried by
its high volatility. However, we work with the same transformation in both variables because
the underlying assumption is that oil prices affect consumer prices, so annual inflation must be
affected by the annual growth rate of oil prices, no matter that the minimum-order stationary
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Figure 1: Annual percent changes for inflation in the euro area r12(PEAt ), Brent
price per barrel in euros r12(OEURt ) and US dollars r
12(OUS$t ), and exchange
rate e/US$, r12(ERt). Source: Eurostat, EIA and OECD.
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variables can then be interpreted as the monthly acceleration in the inflation
rate and annual rate of growth of oil prices, respectively. Figure 2 shows the
profile of these series8.
Table 1 displays some descriptive statistics for the stationary transform. The
p− values in the table show that 1st-differenced transformation of annual rates
assure the stationarity. Note that the volatility of∇r12(OEURt ) and∇r12(OUS$t )
is approximately 65 times higher than that of the ∇r12(PEAt ).
∇r12(PEAt ) ∇r12(OEURt ) ∇r12(OUS$t ) ∇r12(ERt)
Mean -0.01 -0.31 -0.31 0.03
Std. Dev. 0.24 15.82 15.32 3.57
Minimum -1.05 -79.75 -70.89 -8.78
Maximum 0.74 57.63 49.42 10.25
p-value ADF 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
p-value KPSS 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the stationary series for inflation in the
euro area ∇r12(PEAt ), Brent price per barrel in euros ∇r12(OEURt ) and dol-
lars ∇r12(OUS$t ) and exchange rates e/US$ ∇r12(ERt).
2.3 Granger causality test
We will now perform the standard G-causality test (see Granger [1969]) for a
fitted VAR model to assess whether (a) past values of oil prices changes in e
help in predicting current inflation changes in the E.A. and/or b) there exists
the corresponding inverse G-causality effect. If causal effects in Granger sense
operate in both directions, then both variables would be endogenous and a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model would be needed to obtain consistent estimates for
the corresponding dynamic feedback structure.
The G-causality test is implemented by the regressions:
∇r12(PEAt ) = c1 + α1∇r12(PEAt−1) + β1∇r12(OEURt−1 ) + µ1t
∇r12(OEURt ) = c2 + α2∇r12(OEURt−1 ) + β2∇r12(PEAt−1) + µ2t
Table 2 shows the p−values for each F−test with the lag order p =1 chosen
according to the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). Due to the differenc-
ing used to induce stationarity on the series, that is, the monthly change in
annual rates, the lag order p=1 implies effects longer than a year. We do
not find evidence of G-causality from E.A. inflation to oil prices, although we
find very strong evidence (at 1% significance) that ∇r12(OEURt ) Granger-cause
∇r12(PEAt ). The replication of this exercise for the U.S. (results available upon
request to the authors), shows a p-value of 0.0877 when analyzing G-causality
transform for each series can be different.
8∇ = (1− L) is the difference operator, such that ∇ωt = ωt − ωt−1.
6
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
∇r12(PtEA)
−50
0
50
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
∇r12(OtEUR)
−75
−50
−25
0
25
50
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
∇r12(OtUS$)
−5
0
5
10
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
∇r12(ERt)
Figure 2: Stationary series for inflation in the euro area ∇r12(PEAt ), Brent
price per barrel in euros ∇r12(OEURt ) and dollars ∇r12(OUS$t ) and exchange
rate e/US$, ∇r12(ERt). Source: Eurostat, EIA and OECD.
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from U.S. inflation to oil prices in dollars. This results supports the view that
the relationship between oil prices and inflation is very different between E.A.
and U.S. and advise against using our methodology to analyze the relationship
between U.S. inflation and oil prices.
Table 2: p-values for linear G-Causality test. The test is calculated with a VAR
model. The lag order has been selected according to the Schwarz Information
criterion (SIC). One/two/three asterisks denote significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.
lag ∇r12(PEAt )9 ∇r12(OEURt ) ∇r12(OEURt )9 ∇r12(PEAt )
1 0.359326 0.000002 ***
3 Models
3.1 ARIMA Models
The main purpose of our analysis consists in modelling the relationship between
the inflation rate in the euro area ∇r12(PEAt ) and the annual percent growth of
Brent prices in e, ∇r12(OEURt ). The basic shortcoming of this approach is that
the world market is quoted in US$, so the latter variable confounds the effects
of oil price changes with those due to fluctuations in the exchange rates.
To solve this issue we will take into account that OEURt = O
US$
t × ERt,
where OUS$t denotes the nominal prices of Brent in US$ and ERt denotes the
exchange rate (e/US$) at month t, so that the effect of oil prices changes in
US$ are separated from the effect of exchange rate variations.
To accomplish the analysis we start by fitting ARIMA models to the annual
rates of inflation and Brent prices in e and US$. The main estimation and
diagnostic results are summarized in Table 3. These models are used for different
purposes, including forecasting and prewhitening, see Box et al. [1994].
Note that the residual standard deviations of the annual rates of Brent prices
is approximately 66 times higher than that of inflation in the E.A. This is a criti-
cal feature of these variables which explains, e.g., that: (a) the e/US$ exchange
rate is irrelevant to our analysis and (b) the coefficients relating changes in oil
prices with changes in inflation are small in absolute terms.
3.2 Transfer function models
We start by modelling the relationship between the inflation rate in the euro
area r12(PEAt ) and the annual percent growth of Brent prices in e, r
12(OEURt ).
The relationship has been specified by (a) prewhitening both the input and
output series using the ARIMA model for the input (see table 3), and then
(b) computing the cross-correlation function between the prewhitening values
of both variables, which is shown in figure 3.
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Table 3: ARIMA modelling results corresponding to ARIMA(3, 1, 0)×(0, 0, 1)12
process for r12(xt). The figures in parentheses are the standard errors of corre-
sponding parameters.
Variable ∇r12(OEURt ) ∇r12(OUS$t ) ∇r12(PEAt )
φ1 0.048 0.133 0.208
( 0.065 ) ( 0.066 ) ( 0.065 )
φ2 -0.088 -0.104
( 0.065 ) ( 0.066 )
φ3 0.222 0.165
( 0.065 ) ( 0.066 )
Θ1 -0.535 -0.547 -0.546
( 0.06 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.053 )
σa 13.557 13.005 0.203
Q(39)(p-value) 43.247 ( 0.16 ) 49.73 ( 0.051 ) 41.096 ( 0.296 )
The profile of the cross-correlations suggests that inflation is positively corre-
lated with the change in Brent prices in the same month and the month before.
In the inverse direction of G-causality (i.e., with current inflation affecting future
changes in Brent prices) there is not any significant negative correlation. Ac-
cordingly, we confirm our previous findings that G-causality goes from changes
in Brent prices to inflation.
On the basis of this statistical analysis, our tentative specification was: (a)
a relation term where r12(PEAt ) is a function of r
12(OEURt ) and r
12(OEURt−1 ),
combined with (b) an ARIMA(0, 1, 1) × (0, 0, 1)12 model for the error, which
coincides with the ARIMA specification chosen for the output, see table 3. This
specification provides the following estimation results:9
r12(PEAt ) = ( 0.0053
(9×10−4)
+ 0.0044
(9×10−4)
L)r12(OEURt ) + Nˆ
P
t (1)
(1− 0.1389
(0.066)
L)∇NˆPt = (1−0.4517
(0.055)
L12)aˆPt (2)
σˆP = 0.184 log-lik= 60.819
Model (1) confounds the effects of oil price changes with those due to fluctu-
ations in the exchange rates. To solve this issue we should take into account that
OEURt = O
US$
t ×ERt, so the input variable in model (1) can be decomposed in
the following way:
r12(OEURt ) ' r12(OUS$t ) + r12(ERt) (3)
and this decomposition suggests building a new model relating the inflation
rate in the euro area, r12(PEAt ), with the annual growth of Brent prices in US$
9In these equations the letter L denotes the backshift operator, such that for any sequence
ωt: Liωt = ωt−i, i = 0,±1,±2, ..., I.
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Figure 3: Cross correlations between the prewhitened series of inflation in the
euro area, ∇r12(PEAt ) and the lagged annual variation rate of Brent prices in
euros. The shaded area is approximate 5% significance limits for each individual
correlation. Note that negative lags are actually leads for ∇r12(OEURt ).
r12(OUS$t ) and the annual growth of the exchange rate, r
12(ERt). The main
estimation results for this specification are the following:
r12(PEAt ) = ( 0.0057
(9×10−4)
+ 0.0047
(9×10−4)
L)r12(OUS$t )
+ (0.0011
(0.004)
+ 0.0021
(0.004)
L)r12(ERt) + Nˆt
(4)
(1− 0.1351
(0.067)
L)∇Nˆt = (1−0.4424
(0.055)
L12)aˆt (5)
σˆP = 0.182 log-lik= 63.348
where the parameters associated to the exchange rate are non-significant. This
result justifies the following final model:
r12(PEAt ) = ( 0.0056
(9×10−4)
+ 0.0046
(9×10−4)
L)r12(OUS$t ) + Nˆ
P
t (6)
(1− 0.1351
(0.066)
L)∇NˆPt = (1−0.4462
(0.055)
L12)aˆPt (7)
σˆP = 0.182 log-lik= 63.166
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where the likelihood value is: (a) almost identical to the one achieved in model
(4)-(5), so both models can be considered statistically equivalent and (b) larger
than that of model (1)-(2), implying that the final model would be preferred to
models (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) according to any Information Criterion.10
Model (6)-(7) has been submitted to a standard diagnostic testing process
which includes:
1. computing the sample cross-correlation function of the model residuals
against the prewhitened values of the input, see Figure 4, first panel,
which shows no evidence of additional cross-correlation structure,
2. computing the sample cross-correlation function of the same residuals
against the prewhitened values of the e/US$ exchange rate, see Figure
4, second panel, to assure that inflation in the E.A. does not display any
significant reaction to changes in the exchange rate, and
3. overfitting experiments, in which we arbitrarily augmented the lag struc-
ture of model (6)-(7); the corresponding parameters were non-significant
in all cases.
4 Results
4.1 Assessing the likelihood of deflation
As the results in previous section show, changes in oil pricing have a significant
effect on inflation. Accordingly, this variable is relevant to compute short-term
inflation forecasts and, in general, to determine the monetary policy. As oil
prices are highly volatile and, therefore, difficult to predict stricto sensu, it is
reasonable to compute inflation forecasts conditional to a variety of oil price
scenarios.
Accordingly, we will now compute the inflation paths corresponding to differ-
ent scenarios for oil prices, using the model (6)-(7). To this end, first formulate
the basic assumptions described in Table 4.
After setting these assumptions, we need to compute the most likely path
for oil prices to reach the assumed annual variation rates. To this end, we
created three new variables by joining: (a) the past history of r12(OUS$t ) until
December 2015, (b) eleven missing values corresponding to the months between
January 2016 and November 2016, and (c) the value of r12(OUS$t ) correspond-
ing to December 2016 according to each scenario. The missing values were
then interpolated by processing this sample with a fixed-interval smoother, see
Anderson and Moore [1979], assuming that the data generating process is the
10In all the transfer function models, we identified some outliers related with the sharp fall
in oil prices started at the end of 2008. Although these outliers are statistically significant,
the models reported in the main text do not include the corresponding intervention terms
because they do not affect significantly the results of the analysis. We provide them in the
Appendix.
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Figure 4: Cross correlations between: (a) the prewhitened annual variation rate
of Brent prices and the lagged residuals of model (first panel), and (b) the same
residuals and the prewhithened e/US$ exchange rate (second panel).
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Scenario Assumed price Annual variation rate
Stable 37.97 0%
Pessimistic 30.00 -21.0%
Extreme 20.00 -47.3%
Table 4: Scenarios for Brent prices (US$/Barrel) in December 2016 versus De-
cember 2015. The assumptions for pessimistic and extreme scenario consider
that surplus of oil will persist in 2016 combined with a slowing demand expan-
sion. See e.g.,Currie et al. [2015]
.
ARIMA model for r12(OUS$t ) (see Table 3). The output from this procedure can
be interpreted as an univariate forecast for the annual change in Brent price,
conditional to the corresponding end values11. This forecast is then feed to the
transfer function in equations (6)-(7) to compute the corresponding inflation
forecast.
The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 5. As it can be seen,
none of the scenarios considered yields a negative inflation forecast.
Table 5: Annual inflation rates r12(PEAt ) corresponding to different scenarios
for changes in brent prices r12(OUS$t ) in dollars.
Stable Pessimistic Extreme
Year-Month r12(PEAt ) r
12(OUS$t ) r
12(PEAt ) r
12(OUS$t ) r
12(PEAt ) r
12(OUS$t )
2015-12-01 0.23 -39.09 0.23 -39.09 0.23 -39.09
2016-01-01 0.47 -28.54 0.46 -30.06 0.45 -31.97
2016-02-01 0.36 -30.71 0.33 -33.96 0.3 -38.02
2016-03-01 0.35 -27.99 0.3 -32.82 0.25 -38.86
2016-04-01 0.33 -28.1 0.27 -34.72 0.2 -43.01
2016-05-01 0.23 -28.54 0.15 -37.03 0.05 -47.66
2016-06-01 0.29 -25.84 0.2 -36.16 0.07 -49.08
2016-07-01 0.34 -19.61 0.22 -31.75 0.08 -46.96
2016-08-01 0.45 -10.41 0.31 -24.43 0.14 -41.98
2016-09-01 0.6 -8.67 0.44 -24.53 0.25 -44.38
2016-10-01 0.55 -7.56 0.38 -25.05 0.17 -46.96
2016-11-01 0.59 -3.82 0.4 -23.03 0.16 -47.08
2016-12-01 0.67 0 0.46 -21 0.2 -47.3
These results suggest that the effect of oil prices on inflation is relevant but
limited in the short term, as it is not enough by itself to create a long period of
deflation. A deflationary spiral may occur however if an anemic inflation affects
the agents’ expectations and, through them, consumer decisions and economic
activity. In this case, the short-term effect deflationary effects of oil prices would
affect all the components of consumer prices.
11This procedure to compute the highest probability path for the exogenous input is a
modest theoretical contribution of the paper.
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4.2 Estimating the short-term effect of changes in oil prices
We will use the transfer function (6)-(7) to decompose the inflation rate history
in two additive components, one driven by the model input (changes in the
oil prices) and another one driven by the model errors, being the former an
approximation for the short-term effect of changes in oil prices on inflation.
In this case, we can compute the part of annual inflation that can be at-
tributed to changes in Brent prices by propagating the following expression
throughout the sample:
r12(PˆOt ) = 0.0056 r
12(OUS$t ) + 0.0046 r
12(OUS$t−1 ) t = 2, . . . , n (8)
Note that Expression 8 results immediately from the transfer function of
equation 6.12 On the other hand, the part of annual inflation corresponding to
any other factors is trivially computed as:
r12(PˆOthert ) = r
12(PEAt ) − r12(PˆOt ) (9)
Figure 5 shows the profile of inflation in the E.A. versus the estimated effect
of changes in Brent price, computed according to expression (8). It shows clearly
that: (a) Brent prices have been a relevant factor to explain changes in consumer
prices in the euro area13 and (b) from 2013 onwards their effect has been either
neutral or deflationary.
Figure 6 provides further details on the effect of Brent prices from January
2014 to December 2016. It shows that they have been an important deflationary
factor during this period, while the effect of other factors remained stable until
November 2014, declined in December 2014 and January 2015, and started an
inflationary cycle from February 2015 to May 2015.
4.3 A proposal to track inflation/deflation risks in real-
time
The previous analysis suggests that, while oil prices are an important factor
to explain recent deflationary pressures, a prolonged deflationary period would
only occur if the negative evolution of crude factors creates a contagion on the
other determinants of prices, e.g. through the agents expectations.
This idea suggests that the factor r12(PˆOthert ) could be used to track in real-
time the risks of deflation. In particular, as most analysts predict that oil prices
will continue their decline, the future behavior of this component will determine
if inflation will stay in positive values or fall into a negative spiral.
This method is flexible so that, if other risk factors are identified (e.g., weak
economic growth), they could be added as additional inputs to the transfer
functions and taken into account accordingly.
12Casals et al. [2010] derive a procedure to compute this decomposition for a general transfer
function.
13During the period analyzed, this factor accounted for 25% of the variance of the stationary
transform of inflation.
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Figure 5: Annual inflation rates in the E.A. vs. the estimated effect of change
in Brent prices.
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Figure 6: Components of inflation: effect of Brent prices vs. effects of other
factors.
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5 Conclusions
The effect of oil price changes on inflation rates has received renewed interest.
Contrary to the shocks in the 1970s, nowadays it is the deflationary effect of oil
prices which is under scrutiny.
In this work, we propose a method to evaluate the effect of oil price changes
on inflation, as well as an indicator of inflation adjusted for the short-term effect
of oil prices. Tracking such an indicator may be an effective way to assess the
risk of deflation in real time.
We apply the methodology to compute twelve-months ahead forecast for
inflation in the E.A., conditional to different scenarios of oil price deflation
and to estimate which part of the recent evolution of consumer prices can be
attributed to changes in oil prices.
Our main findings are: (a) negative inflation is not expected for the twelve-
months-ahead forecasts in any of the three scenarios, (b) the short-time effect
of oil on consumer prices is important, as it accounts for 25% of the variance
of changes in inflation so, (c) a spiral of deflation/economic contraction could
finally happen if a long period of anemic inflation/deflation affects the consumer
expectations and, through them, the economic activity.
Future research will apply this framework to a disaggregate level of analy-
sis. For example, the risk of deflation for specific countries may be evaluated.
In addition, we will explore the effect of oil price variation on some specific
components of the inflation rate.
Note that the methods proposed here could be applied to solve similar as-
sessment and tracking needs in other frameworks, where a relevant economic
magnitude, e.g., GDP, or unemployment, is affected by a driver variable such
as a business climate indicator or some interest rates. In future papers we plan
to explore some of these analyses.
All the calculations have been implemented in E4, a free MATLAB toolbox
for time series modeling, which can be downloaded at www.ucm.es/info/icae/e4.
This website provides the source code for all the functions in the toolbox under
the terms of the GNU General Public License, as well as a complete user manual
and other reference materials. Besides E4 we also used R and Gretl.
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Appendix
We consider subsample estimations due to the relatively calm shown in first
years for oil prices, the peak (in 2008) and collapse (in 2009), related with the
2008-2009 financial crisis, or the sharp decrease in 2014. Therefore we revise
carefully the residuals of the transfer function models and we found long streaks
of negative residuals in November 2008, May 2009 and July 2009, which profile
suggested the step-type intervention effect
STt =
{
1, if t ≥ T
0, otherwise
, leading to the inclusion of three intervention effects: S
2008/11
t , S
2009/05
t and
S
2009/07
t .
Models (1A)-(2A), (4A)-(5A) and (6A-7A) combine the correspond structure
of the transfer function models (1)-(2), (4)-(5) and (6)-(7) in the paper with the
intervention terms required to capture the aforementioned step-effects.
As the models show, the results are very robust to the inclusion of the
dummy variables, with the rest of the coefficients being very stable so that the
prediction of inflation is similar. Nevertheless, according to the Bayesian Infor-
mation Criteria, the model without the dummies is preferred (-95.49 without
intervening and -95.06 afterwards).
• Models 1A and 2A. HICP in the Euro Area against Brent price in euros
r12(PEAt ) = ( 0.0052
(8×10−4)
+ 0.0042
(8×10−4)
L)r12(OEURt )
− (0.400
(0.161)
+ 0.286
(0.155)
L+ 0.471
(0.155)
L2)S
2008/11
t
− 0.362
(0.155)
S
2009/05
t − 0.391
(0.153)
S
2009/07
t + Nˆ
P
t
(1− 0.118
(0.068)
L)∇NˆPt = (1−0.466
(0.065)
L12)aˆPt
σˆP = 0.174 log-lik= 72.493
• Models 4A and 5A. HICP in the Euro Area against Brent price in US$
and the eur/US$ exchange rate
r12(PEAt ) = ( 0.0057
(9×10−4)
+ 0.0045
(9×10−4)
L)r12(OUS$t )
+ (0.0025
(0.0043)
+ 0.0028
(0.0043)
L)r12(ERt)
− (0.441
(0.161)
+ 0.308
(0.157)
L+ 0.465
(0.155)
L2)S
2008/11
t
− 0.348
(0.154)
S
2009/05
t − 0.388
(0.153)
S
2009/07
t + Nˆ
P
t
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(1− 0.114
(0.068)
L)∇Nˆt = (1−0.454
(0.063)
L12)aˆt
σˆP = 0.171 log-lik= 75.508
• Models 6A and 7A. HICP in the Euro Area against Brent price in US$
r12(PEAt ) = ( 0.0056
(9×10−4)
+ 0.0043
(9×10−4)
L)r12(OUS$t )
− (0.413
(0.158)
+ 0.297
(0.154)
L+ 0.470
(0.153)
L2)S
2008/11
t
− 0.346
(0.154)
S
2009/05
t − 0.390
(0.152)
S
2009/07
t + Nˆ
P
t
(1− 0.119
(0.067)
L)∇NˆPt = (1−0.461
(0.063)
L12)aˆPt
σˆP = 0.172 log-lik= 75.005
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